guns in order to achieve a family of matched projectiles of relatively high performance.
"(d) Through the experience gained in this development program obtain information, data and experience which, combined with current gun research for an optimum gun, might materially aid in the development of an optimum gun for aircraft within the next ten to fifteen years.
"To support such a program, this Bureau will initiate projects complementary to those undertaken by the Ordnance Department (ASF) to provide competent and experienced personnel and afford Navy Ordnance facilities to assist in the program. In addition, this Bureau will furnish funds to support a proportional part of this development program as established by the estimates of the Chief of Ordnance."
This letter resulted in the cooperation of the Army, with Navy engineering personnel, familiar with the conditions that needed remedy-
ing, in solving the various problems. Today, barely five years after the war, every point brought out by the Navy's Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance has been answered. Nothing was basically wrong with the weapon. Its wartime performance, good or bad, was the result of having been bought in desperation, put into mass production without first having been adequately proved, and then modified regularly to meet a future commitment before the previous .model had been made to function reliably.
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